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CASE COMMENT

THE NEED FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION IN THE APPLICATION OF TITLE
VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964:
BOURESLAN V. ARAMCO
Discrimination in employment, as one phase of the total civil rights
problem, has its international implications. Each incident pointing
up our deficiencies in extending to all our citizens full and equal
rights and opportunities casts doubt upon our sincerity and motives in the international sphere. Because the majority of the
world's people are non-white and have a growing influence in international relations, these incidents cannot have but significant adverse effects upon foreign relations, both politically and
economically. 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

International law recognizes the need to eradicate employment
discrimination. 2 In addition to international treaties and conventions, national labor legislation also plays a significant role in effectuating the international community's policy against employment
discrimination in the United States. 3 Extraterritorial jurisdiction
1. Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152, as Amended by Subcomm. No. 5 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2302 (1963) (submitted by Mr. Powell
from the Committee on Education and Labor).
2. See I. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 4.10 (1984). The United Nations has
been instrumental in implementing non-discriminatory principles in the workplace on an
international level. The principles also help to serve as guidelines to national programs. Id.;
see, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979); see also T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 273-74 (2d ed. 1984). In 1944, the International Labor Organization ("ILO"), an
organization affiliated with the United Nations, was created to adopt international labor
standards that are embodied in conventions and recommendations. Id. Many of the ILO
· conventions and recommendations also focus on equal opportunity and treatment in employment. Id.; see, e.g., Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 1956);
Convention Concerning Employment Policy 1964 (No. 122); Discrimination (Employment
and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111); Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No.
100); Recommendation, 1951 (No. 90).
3. See T. MERON, supra note 2, at 275. "Thus, the utility of these instruments lies in
the availability of machinery for their acceptance by states and their effective implementa-
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allows a national law to operate outside of its traditional boundaries to international situations in light of potential conflicts with
foreign nations:' The expansion of United States multinational
corporations into foreign markets, however, raises the issue of
whether United States labor legislation should have extraterritorial
application. 6
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") 6 protects individuals against job discrimination based on their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 7 Over the past two decades,
the federal district courts have afforded Title VII extraterritorial
jurisdiction by extending this protection to American citizens employed abroad by American employers. 8 Although Title VII never
explicitly granted enforcement outside the United States territories, the district courts have generally justified their application of
extraterritorial jurisdiction implicitly through statutory construction. 9 The district courts have drawn a negative inference of the
law's alien exemption provision to justify extending Title VII's
scope to acts of employment discrimination perpetrated abroad. 10
The relevant part of this provision provides that Title VII "should
not apply to an employer with respect to employment of aliens
outside of any state. " 11
tion." Id.; see also Supplemental Brief for En Banc Rehearing of Appellee (ASC) at Appendix C, Boureslan v. Aramco, 863 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2206). The ILO Convention
No. 111, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), which prohibits employment discrimination based on "race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or
social origin," has been ratified by 109 nations. Id.; see supra note 2.
4. See V. NANDA & D. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS§
5.01 (1988).
5. See Brereton, U.S. Multinational Companies: Operations in 1985, 67 SuRv. CURRENT
Bus. 26 (1987) In 1985, United States multinational corporations; total assets were
$4,291,764 million and its foreign affiliates aggregately employed approximately 6.4 million
people. Id. No statistical evidence of the number of American citizens employed abroad by
United States multinational corporations could be ascertained. But see Labor Letter, Wall
St. J., Feb. 12, 1985, at 1, col. 5. According to a survey of United States company consultants, the number American citizens employed abroad for United States employers in 1984
declined by an average of 148 to 135. Id.
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
7. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(l). "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, or national origin." Id.
8. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
9. Id.
10. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (amended in 1972 to include federal
employees). "This title shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of
aliens, outside of any state.... " Id.
11. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals en bane in Boureslan v.
Aramco, 12 reheard the first federal court of appeals decision addressing the extraterritorial application of Title VII and affirmed
the majority panel's reversal of this line of case law which rejected
the negative inference of the alien exemption provision. 13 The majority adopted the majority panel's application of the well established canon of statutory construction that, unless Congress indicates to the contrary, the court is to construe federal legislation to
have only domestic application. a In the absence of the requisite
congressional intent in Title VII's statutory language and legislative history, the majority upheld the presumption against extraterritoriality. 15 On the other hand, the dissent asserted that extraterritorial application of United States national civil rights laws does
not unreasonably infringe upon another nation's sovereignty in applying its own labor laws nor place the American employer at a
disadvantage for labor in foreign markets. 16 Moreover, the dissent
contended that overseas enforcement of Title VII promotes the international consensus against employment discrimination. 17
This Comment examines the Boureslan majority's application
of the presumption against extraterritoriality and whether, by denying Title VII extraterritorial jurisdiction, the majority was faithful to the canon of statutory construction. Part II discusses the
presumption against extraterritorial application and how the
United States Supreme Court and the Federal Courts of Appeals
have applied these principles in interpreting analogous federal labor legislation. Part III examines Title VII's statutory language
and legislative history18 and how the courts have construed them.
12. 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1987), aff'd, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988), aff'd on
reh'g, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990).
13. See Bouresla.n, 892 F.2d at 1273 (citing Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1018).
14. See id. at 1272; Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1017-21.
15. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273 (citing Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1019).
16. See id. at 1277, 1283.
·
17. See id. at 1283.
18. See UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 at 9-11 (1968). The legislative
history of Title VII is unusual in nature because H.R. 405, reported by the House Education
and Labor Committee of the 87th Congress, is incorporated into H.R. 7152, which the 88th
Congress passed as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 9. After extensive hearings, the
House Judiciary Committee approved H.R. 7152 through bipartisan support. Id. The House
debated and passed H.R. 7152 within ten days due to President Kennedy's assassination
and the priority given to this civil rights legislation. Id. at 10. Despite the lack of a Senate
report, H.R. 7152, which included the Senate's amendments, progressed to a vote without
debate or resolution of any discrepancies. Id. at 10-11. H.R. 7152 returned to the House and
was approved, as amended by the Senate, after only one hour of debate. Id. at 11; see gener-
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Part IV discusses the facts of Boureslan and the treatment accorded those facts by the majority and dissenting opinions. Lastly,
Part V analyzes the majority's reasoning for upholding the presumption against extraterritoriality, criticizes the dissent's analysis
of the canon of statutory construction, and recommends that Title
VII should be afforded extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Comment
concludes that the Boureslan majority adhered to the canon of
statutory construction by denying Title VII application overseas in
light of the absence of the requisite congressional intent. The majority properly deferred policy considerations to Congress. Although this Comment concludes that the dissent's analysis in statutory construction is technically incorrect, it emphasizes the
dissent's opinion because it sets forth national and foreign policy
considerations that support the need for Congress to make Title
VII enforceable outside the United States.
II.

THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY

A.

The Canon of Statutory Construction

Congress has the constitutional authority to promulgate legislation in regulating American citizens and their conduct outside
the United States. 19 The Supreme Court has determined, however,
tha~ federal legislation should only be afforded extraterritorial jurisdiction where Congress evinces an intent to have the legislation
extend extraterritorially. 20 The requisite congressional intent must
be manifested in the statutory language, legislative history, or administrative interpretations. 21 An underlying justification of this
canon of statutory construction is that traditionally the Court has
presumed that Congress enacts laws that are to apply domestically
to avoid interfering with another nation's sovereignty. 22
ally B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS, PART II 1291
(1970).
19. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313
U.S. 69, 73 (1941); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932). From the international perspective, see I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (1970); M.
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 352-57 (2d ed. 1986). Extraterritorial jurisdiction by a state
based on regulation of its citizens outside its territory is commonly referred to as the "nationality principle" of jurisdiction in international law. Id.
20. See Steele, 344 U.S. at 285; Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo Bros., 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949); United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299 (1944); Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 437; United
States v. Bowman 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
21. See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285-90.
22. See id. at 285; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 402 comment b (1987). Territorial jurisdiction exercised by the state
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Requisite Congressional Intent for Federal Labor Statutes

Although there is a presumption against extraterritoriality, it
is rebuttable. 23 The Supreme Court has required explicit congressional intent to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality where a law's global reach would yield potential conflicts with
another nation's territorial jurisdiction.u Although federal anticompetition legislation has generally been afforded extraterritorial
application, 25 federal labor legislation has been traditionally denied
extraterritorial jurisdiction26 because labor is construed as primarily a domestic concern. 27
In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduin which the activity or conduct has occurred is the traditional jurisdictional procedure. Id.
Alternatively, the state of nationality of the actor can also exercise jurisdiction under exceptional circumstances. Id. The concurrent exercise of jurisdiction by the state nationality and
by the territorial state may culminate in actual or potential conflicts. Id.
23. See Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing
Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.S.L., 730 F.2d 1003, 1107-08 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1984)).
24. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22
(1962) (requiring the threshold level of congressional intent to be affirmatively expressed);
Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286 (requiring clearly expressed congressional intent to overcome
the presumption against extraterritoriality).
25. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988); Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706 (1962) (holding a conspiracy to monopolize or
restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of
the Sherman Act just because part of the conduct complained occurs in foreign countries);
Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1979) (exporting and
other commercial transactions between the United States and a foreign country that adversely and materially affect United States trade are not exempt from United States antitrust laws in light of the act or agreement happening outside United States territories). For
anticompetitive acts dealing with trademarks and patents, see Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1051-127 (1988); see, e.g., Steele, 344 U.S. at 287 (district court may award injunctive relief
for trademark infringements and unfair competition perpetrated abroad by a United States
corporation because extraterritorial reach does not interfere with Mexico's trade practices).
26. See Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 273
F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 988 (1960) (denying the extraterritorial
application of the Railway Labor Act); Airlines Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n lnt'l v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 F;2d 170 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 901 (1959)
(denying the extraterritorial application of the Railway Labor Act); Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957) (denying the extraterritorial application of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947); Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918)
(denying the extraterritorrial application of the Seaman's Act of 1915).
27. See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286 ("an intention so to regulate labor conditions
which are the primary concern of a foreign country should not be attributed to Congress in
the absence of a clearly expressed purpose"). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 414 comment c. "Jurisdiction may be exercised . . . over activities of a branch or subsidiary related to international transactions, . . .
but not generally over predominantly local activites, such as industrial and labor relations .
. . ."Id.
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ras, 28 the Supreme Court refused to apply the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 29 extraterritorially after finding that Congress did not intend the Act "to have application to foreign
registered vessels employing alien seamen." 30 The Court concluded
that extraterritorial application of the NLRA would be an affront
to Honduran sovereignty if the United States regulated the internal management disputes of an American corporation overseas employing Honduran citizens. 31 In light of the potential international
jurisdictional conflicts and the absence of affirmative congressional
intent, the Court declined to extend concurrent application of the
NLRA and deferred to Congress whether the NLRA should have
an extraterritorial scope. 32
The Supreme Court has also examined whether Congress intended the Eight Hour Law to have extraterritorial application. 33
Due to the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent,
the Supreme Court in Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo 3 • denied to apply
the Eight Hour Law extraterritorially because enforcement of the
Act would conflict with the sovereignty of Iran and Iraq in regulating local work conditions according to their own mores and customs. 35 In reviewing the statutory language, legislative history and
administrative interpretations the Court concluded that Congress
failed to clearly express its intent. 36 Therefore, the Court applied
the presumption against extraterritoriality. 37 The Court reasoned
that despite the Eight Hour Law's broad inclusive language, 38 the
Act failed to distinguish between "laborers who are aliens and
those who are citizens of the United States." 39 In the absence of
this distinction, the Court ruled that Congress must have intended
that the Eight Hour Law should be limited to regulating domestic
28. 372 U.S. 10 (1962).
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
30. See McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 19-20 (neither the legislative history nor the specific

language couched in "commerce" terms reflected the boundaries of the Act's impact).
31. See id. at 21.
32. See id. at 21-22 (citing The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) and
holding that extraterritorial application of the NLRA intrudes upon the international laws
of the high seas and an "act of Congress ought never be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains").
33. Contract Work Hours Standard Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-26 (repealed 1962).
34. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
35. See id. at 286.
36. See id. at 285-90.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 287 (rejecting the assertion that the statutory language of "every contract" implied work contracts perfomed in foreign countries).
39. See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286.
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work conditions; otherwise, Congress would be preempting the labor laws of Iran and Iraq.4°

C.

Congressional Reaction to the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")• 1 is
the most closely related labor statute to Title VII. Both civil rights
statutes share a common goal of eradicating employment discrimination and contain similar substantive provisions. 42 Several federal
circuit courts of appeal have refused to apply the ADEA extraterritorially prior to its amendment in 1984.43 The courts concluded
that no affirmative congressional intent can be ascertained from
the ADEA's statutory language, legislative history, and administrative interpretations to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.•• They buttressed their reasoning on three factors. First,
the ADEA incorporates the Fair Labor Standards Act's procedure
and policies, which explicitly deny extraterritorial application.4 5
Second, the courts have merely reaffirmed the "general policy of
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality of labor
40. See id. at 290-91.
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982 & Supp. V 1988) (prohibiting employers from arbitrarily
discriminating against persons over the age of 40).
42. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1977).
43. See DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a 65-year-old United States citizen who worked in Canada for six years prior to his
termination had no protection under the ADEA where the American employer filled his
position with a younger employee); Ralis v. RFE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding a 43-year-old
United States citizen employed in Honduras who sought a transfer back to the United
States and was subsequently fired by the United States corporation had no protection under
the ADEA because the employment occurred in a fereign workplace); Thomas v. Brown
Roots, Inc., 745 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1984); Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607
(3d Cir. 1984) (holding a 64-year-old United States citizen employed in England had no
protection under the ADEA upon his termination by the parent company located in the
United States because there was lack of sufficient nexus between the parent corporation and
its foreign affiliate).
44. See id.
45. See Cleary, 728 F.2d at 608-09. The Cleary court held that Congress is presumed to
be aware of the court's interpretation of the domestic scope of the FSLA and yet it incorporated like provisions in the ADEA; therefore, Congress intended the ADEA to have no extraterritorial application. Id.; cf. Thomas, 745 F.2d at 828 (affirming Cleary); Pfeiffer, 755
F.2d at 555-56 (affirming the Cleary analysis but asserting it to be debatable in light of the
inexact fit betwen the FSLA and the ADEA); DeYoreo, 785 F.2d at 1283 (affirming Pfeiffer);
Zahourek, 750 F.2d at 828 (affirming Pfeiffer). See generally Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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laws." 46 Lastly, the ADEA lacks language similar to alien exemption provision of Title VII, which has been construed to afford Title VII extraterritorial application. 47 Congress reacted to these judicial decisions by amending the ADEA with explicit jurisdictional
language to overcome the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of federal labor statutes. 48 The amendment provides
that the term "employee includes any individual who is a citizen of
the United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a
foreign country." 49
Ill. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
TITLE VII

A. Definitions
The legislative history of Title VII provides that Congress intended to regulate equal employment opportunities pursuant to its
commerce clause powers. 50 The Act's pivotal terms of "commerce"
and "industry affecting commerce" must be carefully examined to
determine the scope of Title VII's coverage. n Some commentators
have stated the wording "between a state and any place outside
46. Cleary, 728 F.2d at 609; see Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 557.
47. See Cleary, 728 F.2d at 609 (citing Bryant v. International Schools Service, Inc.,
675 F.2d 472, 482 (D.N.J. 1980)); see also Ralis, 770 F.2d at 1124; Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 559.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 1037, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CoNG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2974, 3000.
When considering this amendment, the Committee was cognizant of the well established principle of sovereignty, that no nation has the right to impose its labor standards on another country. That is why the amendment is carefully worded to apply
only to citizens of the United States who are working for United States corporations
or their subsidiaries.
Id.
49. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (Supp. 1988).
50. See generally UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 at 3076-78 (1968) (reprinting a memorandum submitted by Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
as to the constitutionality of Title VII, which was inserted in the record by Senator Clark, a
floor leader of the House-approved H.R. 7152).
51. These terms are . based on the definition of employer, which embodies the term
"commerce" and "industry affecting commerce," and are of great significance to understanding the statutory scheme. "[E]mployer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce .... "Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). "[T]he
term commerce means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several states, or between a state and any place thereof... ."Id. § 2000e(h).
"[T]he term industry affecting commerce means any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in labor disputes would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free-flow of commerce
and includes any activity or industry affecting commerce within the meaning of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1958" Id. § 2000e(g).
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therefore" found in the definition of commerce indicates that Congress at the very least intended Title VII to apply to American
employers' operations abroad. 62 The legislative history also reveals
that Congress intended Title VII to have international application
by employing standard "commerce" type language. 63 The Supreme
Court, however, has ruled that this type of statutory scheme is inconclusive proof to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality when couched in terms of "commerce."64
B.

The Alien Exemption Provision and the Courts'
Interpretation

As indicated above, this provision explicitly denies Title VII
coverage to aliens employed outside the United States. 66 The legislative history provides little guidance as to the implications of the
alien exemption provision. 66 In Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 67 how52. See Note, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Multinational Enterprise, 73 GEO. L.J. 1465, 1469-70 (1985); Note, Civil Rights in Employment and the Multinational Corporations, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 87, 93-94 (1976).
53. See UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 at 3091 (1968) (recorded by Chairman Emmanuel Cellar, the key sponsor to the Act in the House Judiciary Committee). "Title VII covers employers engaged in industries affecting commerce that is to say interstate
and foreign commerce. . . ." Id.
54. See, e.g., McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21 (denying the NLRA's definitions of "commerce" and "affecting commerce" definitions meaning for the NLRA's scope to extend
outside the United States); Benz, 353 U.S. at 144 (denying the Labor Management Relations Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982) ("LMRA"), extraterritorial jurisdiction because its "commerce" and "industry affecting commerce" terms do not clearly express extraterritorial reach); see generally H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (revealing
that the NLRA and LMRA commerce provisions are comparable).
55. See supra note 10.
56. See UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF C1v1L RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 at 1004 (1968). Upon enacting Title
VII, the congressional debate focusing on the alien exemption provision entertained the sole
issues of exempting religious and educational institutions. Id.; see also Kirschner, The Extraterritorial Application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 34 LAB. L.J. 394, 399-400
(1983). The alien exemption provision's language was apparently derived from a civil rights
bill introduced by Adm. Clayton Powell in 1949 and was simply adopted into Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act. Id. The Clayton Bill was introduced at a time when the constitutional
rights of aliens were questionable and there was heightened dislike for aliens within the
United States; therefore, it is asserted that the bill's language was carefully drafted to ensure that aliens were not precluded from "certain domestic labor protective legislation." Id.
at 400 n.26; see also Note, Civil Rights in Employment and the Multinational Corporations, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 87, 95 n.45 (1976) (citing the Fair Employment Practice Act,
H.R. 44-53, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reported out of the COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND
LABOR, H.R. REP. No. 1165, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949)).
57. 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (holding that denial of employment opportunities by requiring
employees to be United States citizens is not an unlawful employment practice under Title
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ever, the Supreme Court determined the scope of Title VII by
drawing a negative inference from this provision. 68 The Court concluded that the alien exemption provision denies Title VII coverage to aliens outside the United States.1~ Thus, the negative inference drawn from the provision provides Title VII protection to
aliens within the United States.
Despite the Supreme Court's limited interpretation of the
alien exemption provision's negative implication, the Federal District Court of Colorado in Love v. Pullman interpreted the identical Title VII language more broadly. 60 The court drew an alternative negative inference from this provision, and concluded that
Congress explicitly denied Title VII protection to aliens outside
the United States. 61 This conclusion intimated the court's belief
that Congress intended to provide Title VII coverage to citizens
employed outside the United States by an American employer who
would otherwise have been covered by Title VIl. 62 To substantiate
this alternative negative inference, the court relied upon the Supreme Court's reasoning to afford federal antitrust legislation extraterritorial application, 63 and stated that "nothing in the legislative history addresses this specific point" but that nothing
contradicts it. 64
In Bryant v. International Schools Serv., Inc., 65 the first federal case squarely addressing the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Title VII, the New Jersey District Court found Love's reasoning persuasive.66 In the absence of explicit congressional intent to extend
9

VII because it is different than discriminating against employees based on national origin).
58. See id. at 95 (the term "individual" also entitles aliens Title VII protection as illustrated by the definition of employer at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(l)).
59. See id.
60. See Love v. Pullman, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423, 426 n.4 (D. Colo. 1976),
aff'd on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1074 (10th Cir. 1978) (Canadian porters while employed in
the United States are protected by Title VII).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Continental Ore Co., 370 U.S. at 690 (a United States exporter may bring suit
in the United States unde.r § 4 of the Clayton Act where he was deprived a market in Canada due to alleged conspiracy, in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
which had adverse consequences to him in the United States).
64. See Love, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 426 n.4.
65. 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982)
(the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's holding because plaintiff's failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination mandated by Title VII).
66. See id. at 474-76 (upholding a cause of action brought by two American teachers
alleging that their employer, a United States corporation that contracted with the Iranian
government, discriminated against them by withholding benefits, which were made available
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the Act beyond the United States territories, the court nonetheless
concluded that the Love alternative negative inference of the alien
exemption provision overcomes the presumption against extraterritoriality. 67 The Love line of reasoning gained more acceptance in
the district court. 68 This alternative negative inference, however,
has been questioned. 69 The district court's precedent in supporting
the extraterritorial application of Title VII, in light of the presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal legislation, was challenged in Boureslan v. Aramco before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 70

IV. Boureslan v. Aramco
A.

The Facts of the Case

In 1979, Ali Boureslan, a naturalized citizen of the United
States, was employed by Aramco Services Company ("ASC"), a
Delaware corporation, as a cost engineer in Houston, Texas. 71
Boureslan had worked approximately sixteen months with ASC
and alleged no discriminatory treatment while employed in the
United States. 72 Upon his request, Boureslan obtained a transfer to
the Arabian American Oil Company ("Aramco"), ASC's parent
corporation. 73
by other corporations employing American citizens in Iran).
67. See id. at 482-83. (the negative inference fairly interprets congressional intent to
afford Title VII extraterritorial coverage without addressing the foreign policy implications).
68. See Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F. Supp. 590 (D. Md. 1986) (applying the
reasoning in Bryant, 675 F.2d at 472); Kern v. Dynaelectron, 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex.
1983), aff'd mem., 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984) (assuming Title VII's extraterritorial jurisdiction without interpreting Title VII based on the canon of statutory construction); EEOC
v. Institute of Gas Technology, 23 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 825 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (applying Title VII extraterritorially without determining whether the requisite congressional intent was satisfied).
69. See Bryant, 675 F.2d at 477 n.23. "Our holding in no way answers the questions
raised by jurisdictional challenge. No court has decided the extraterritorial applicability of
Title VII and we find it unnecessary to do so to decide this case." For an interpretative
view, see Kirschner, supra note 56, at 398-99 (since the majority or the concurring opinion
never entertained the extraterritorial impact of Title VII, Bryant lacks precedent). But see
I. LARSON, supra note 2, at § 5.60 (the Third Circuit, by "not[ing] that the district court's
holding that the statute may be extraterritorially applied ... apparently indicate[d] a sub
silentio upholding of jurisdiction... ").
70. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1017-21.
71. See id. at 1015-16.
72. See Brief for Appellees (Aramco) at 3, Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir.
1988) (No. 87-2206) [hereinafter Brief for Appellees].
73. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1016.
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On November 11, 1980, Boureslan started work at Aramco74 in
Saudi Arabia as a construction engineer.n He contended that, in
September of 1981, his supervisor at Aramco began "a campaign of
harassment" against him because of his Lebanese ancestry, Arab
race and Muslim religion. 76 Boureslan alleged that in retaliation for
having brought a formal grievance process against his supervisor,
Aramco manipulated its policies and procedures to justify his discharge in June 1984. 77 He alleged that his termination was "pretextual in nature because of his race, religion, and national origin. ''78
After filing timely charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), Boureslan brought an action
pursuant section 703 of Title VII against ASC and Aramco in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas. 79 Contrary to the reasoning in Love, the district court dismissed Bourselan's claim, holding that the negative inference of the alien exemption provision was inconclusive proof of congressional intent to
afford Title VII extraterritorial jurisdiction. 80 Upon reviewing the
statutory language and legislative history of Title VII, and prior
Supreme Court cases denying extraterritorial application to other
federal labor statutes, the district court concluded that Congress
never implicitly or explicitly addressed the extraterritorial impact
of Title VIl. 81
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Boureslan's appeal
and request for rehearing. 82 On appeal and rehearing, Boureslan
argued against the district court's narrow construction of the extraterritorial scope of Title VIl. 83 He also argued that the alien ex74. See Brief for the Appellees, supra note 72, at 3. For discussion on whether Aramco
is an employee under Title VII. Aramco conceded that it was subject to Title VII because it
alleged only subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Although Aramco's assets are benefically owned
by the Government of Saudi Arabia and its work force is composed of less than twelve
percent of American citizens, it is a United States employer incorporated in Delaware. Id.
75. See id. at 3.
76. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1016.
77. See Brief for Appellant (Boureslan) at 4, Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th
Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2206) [hereinafter Brief of the Appellant].
78. See id. at 4-5.
79. Boureslan, 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
80. See id. at 630 (holding Bryant suspect in light of the Supreme Court's interpretation in Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), of the alien exemption
provision).
81. See id. at 630-31.
82. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1015 Uoined by the EEOC as amicus curiae); see also
Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1271.
83. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1015.
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emption provision is meaningless unless the Love alternative negative inference is drawn. 84
B.

The Majority Opinion

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed the rulings of
the lower court and the majority panel and dismissed the action
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 86 The court applied the canon of statutory construction and upheld the presumption against
the extraterritorial application of federal legislation. 88 Upon examination of the statutory language of Title VII, the majority concluded that no explicit congressional intent could be ascertained. 87
The majority rejected the district court's decision holding that
the alternative negative inference of the alien exemption provision
satisfied the requisite congressional intent to afford Title VII pro ..
tection to United States citizens employed abroad. 88 Contrary to
Boureslan's assertion that the alien exemption provision is meaningless without the Love alternative negative inference, the Court ,
held that the provision has two clear purposes. 89 The first purpose
is obviously to make Title VII inapplicable to aliens outside the
United States; the second purpose is to extend Title VII's coverage
84. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1272.
85. See id. at 1271.
86. See id. at 1272-74.
87. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1018-19. On appeal, the majority panel examined the
definitional section of Title VII and held that the extraterritorial application of Title VII
was not addressed in the pivotal definitions of "employer", 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and "commerce", 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g), or in the alien exemption provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g). See
id. at 1018. This reasoning was adopted by the majority on rehearing. See Boureslan, 892
F.2d at 1271. The majority on rehearing, however, further examined the plain language of
the Act to buttress its conclusion that Congress never explicitly addressed the extraterritorial reach of Title VII. First, the majority reexamined the broad definition of "employer"
and held that the extraterritorial scope of Title VII was not intended by Congress because
foreign employers who employ United States citizens and who engaged in United States
commerce would be interpreted as employers under Title VII. See id. at 1273 (citing Spiess
v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981)). Second, the majority reexamined the state discrimination employment provisions in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(c) to
(e), and held that Congress did not intend Title VII to apply extraterritorially because it
would have made specific references in the above provisions to avoid conflicts with foreign
discrimination laws. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273. Third, the majority construed the
venue provision in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(3), and the EEOC's investigatory powers
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9, and concluded that no explicit congressional intent was
found in the above provisions which are typical provisions in which Congress ordinarily addresses extraterritoriality. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273. Finally the majority reexamined
the alien exemption provision, which was reargued on rehearing. See id. at 1272-73.
88. See id.; see also supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
89. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273 (citing Bourselan, 857 F.2d at 1018).
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to aliens within the United States. 90
On rehearing, the majority also adopted the majority panel's
conclusion that the legislative history of Title VII provided no basis to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. 91 The
three general policy statements from the legislative history offered
by the EEOC 92 were held to be inconclusive proof of congressional
intent to support extraterritorial jurisdiction of Title VIl. 93 Rather,
the majority reasoned that these statements lacked specificity in
light of the language of the statute and legislative history, which
are laden with terms such as "United States" and "states."94
The majority supported its use of the presumption against extraterritoriality by noting the serious foreign policy issues that may
arise on account of a conflict between our national civil rights laws
and other nation's mores and customs. 96 The majority panel's rea90. See id.; see also supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
91. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273 (citing Bourselan, 857 F.2d at 1019).
92. See Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Amicus Curiae at 814, Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2206) [hereinafter EEOC
Brief]. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission offered these statements to show
that Congress intended all citizens to be protected by Title VII regardless of geographical
restrictions. Id. at 13. The first statement provided that "to remove obstructions to the free
flow of interstate and foreign commerce and to insure the complete and full enjoyment by
all persons of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured and protected by the Constitution. Id. (citing HousE REPORT ON CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 26, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2402). The second
statement provided that "[a] key purpose of the bill, then is to secure to all Americans the
equal protection of the laws of the United States and of the several states." EEOC Brief at
14. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2488 (statement of Rep. William McCulloch, ranking minority member
of the House Judiciary Committee). The last statement was the continuation of the minority report which states that "the rights of citizenship means little if an individual is unable
to gain the economic wherewithal to enjoy or properly use them." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No.
914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391,
2516).
93. See Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 94 (the EEOC's interpretation is to be afforded "great
deferrence" except where its interpretations can be proven through "compelling indications"). Accord Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1019. The majority gave no deferrence to the EEOC's
interpretation in light of Espinoza because the majority held that the EEOC was inexperienced in determining jurisdictional issues. Id. at 1019. But cf. E.E.O.C. Will Look Closely at
Overseas Bias Charges, 130 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 388 (1989) (citing speech by Commissioner Joy Cherian at City University of New York's Baruch College on March 8, 1989).
Subsequent to Boureslan, the EEOC declared that it will continue "to adhere 'very strictly'
to the requirements that Title VII must conflict with the laws of the foreign country before
conduct prohibited by Title VII will be excusabl~." Id.
94. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273 (citing Bourselan, 857 F.2d at 1019). "The Act's
language and legislative history make repeated references to the 'United States,' 'states,'
and procedures relating to state proceedings without parallel references to foreign countries." Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1019.
95. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1273 (citing American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
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soning, adopted by the majority on rehearing, also argued that extending Title VII protection to American employees abroad would
seriously impair international operations of American employers
who would be forced to abandon their operations or abstain from
employing United States citizens. 96 Refusing "to read between the
lines" of Title VII, the majority upheld the presumption against
extraterritoriality and concluded that any resulting inequities to
American employees working abroad are policy issues best addressed by Congress. 97

C.

The Dissenting Opinion

The dissent asserted that the majority misapplied the canon of
statutory construction by requiring explicit, affirmative language to
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. 98 Because
Congress addressed the extraterritorial scope of Title VII in the
alien exemption provision, the dissent contended that the majority
distorted the presumption to avoid reaching foreign policy issues. 99
The dissent noted that there are, in fact, two presumptions and
applied a two-pronged test to determine which applied and
whether it could be overcome. 100 Two presumptions were employed
· because "not every exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction violates
213 U.S. 347 (1909)). "The respect for the right of nationals to regulate conduct within their
own borders is a fundemental concept of sovereignty that is not lightly tossed aside." Id. In
initially setting forth the precedent upholding a presumption against extraterritoriality, the
majority noted that "[t]he fear of outright collisions between domestic and foreign law, collisions both hard on the people caught in the cross-fire and a potential source of friction
between the United States and foreign countries lies behind the presumption against extraterritoriality." Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1017 (citing Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 557).
96. See id. at 1020.
97. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274. "Congress demonstrated in the [ADEA, the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-116 (1979 & Supp. 1989), and the
Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-20 (Supp. 1989)] its awareness of the
need to make a clear statement of extraterritorial application, address the concerns of conflicting foreign law, and provide the usual nuts-and-bolts provisions for enforcing those
rights." Id.; see Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1029. "Given the serious, potentially devisive policy
to such an application either in the Act itself or the debates in Congress is a compelling
argument that Congress did not turn its attention to this possibility. It is not for this court
to decide this policy issue for the legislative branch." Id.
98. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274 n.1; see also Boureselan, 857 F.2d at 1021-23. The
dissent argued that the broad jurisdictional language of the statute is not required to overcome the presumption against extraterritotiality. Id.
99. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1283.
100. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274-75 (citing Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1021-31). The
dissent did not reiterate Judge King's analysis in the rehearing opinion, thus all references
for purposes of this Comment will refer to the decision in the initial appeal.

Published by SURFACE, 1990

15

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1990], Art. 5

308

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 16:293

international law." 101 The first presumption provided that the
court is not to apply federal legislation extraterritorially unless
Congress indicates to the contrary; the second provides that the
court should not construe a statute to unreasonably frustrate international law. 102
The dissent asserted that a more structured analysis of the
foreign policy issues is needed to avoid defeating congressional intent. 103 The first prong, therefore, focused on whether extraterritorial application of a statute would violate international law by infringing upon another nation's sovereignty. 1 °" To determine
whether international law was violated, the dissent implemented
the jurisdictional rule of reason in section 403 of the Restatement
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 106
The second prong focused on whether the presumption in the
first prong can be overcome based on the finding of the requisite
congressional intent. 106 The dissent asserted that the two presumptions require different levels of congressional intent to be overcome. 107 After concluding that extraterritorial jurisdiction does not
101. See id. at 1025; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 402.
102. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1022-24.
103. See id. at 1024-25.
104. See id. at 1025-26.
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(2). Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent
to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to
be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to
protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and
the degree to which the desireability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.

Id.
106. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1024.
107. See id.
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unreasonably conflict with international law, the dissent argued
that the presumption against extraterritoriality that be overcome
by statutory construction as well .as legislative history. 108 The presumption against extraterritoriality, therefore, may be overcome
through implicit congressional intent. 109 Conversely, upon concluding that extraterritorial jurisdiction conflicts with international
law, the dissent asserted that the courts must find affirmative congressional intent to overcome the presumption that "an act of Congress ought never be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains. " 110 Therefore, express jurisdictional language is necessary because only Congress can prescribe
legislation that unreasonably conflicts with international law. 111
In applying the two-pronged test, the dissent concluded that
application of Title VII to United States citizens abroad was reasonable in the interest of advancing the civil rights of United
States citizens and the international policy of eradicating employment discrimination. m Depriving United States citizens of a remedy against employment discrimination by a United States corporation has cumulative discriminatory effects within the United
States that may satisfy the "reasonableness" requirement pursuant
to section 403 of the Restatement. 118 Denial of Title VII protection
108. See id. at 1034. But see Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1277 n.3. "Contrary to the majority's characterization" the dissent argued that the legislative history is not "to compensate
for a lack of statutory language" because the plain language of the Act is sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id.
109. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1022 (relying on the Court's language in Foley Bros.);
accord Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285 ("the canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, ... is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent can be ascertained." (citation omitted; emphasis added)).
110. See Boureslari., 857 F.2d at 1023 (citing The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at
118); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 114.
111. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1023; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 115 comment a.
112. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1283; see also supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
For further discussion of international civil rights agreements, see Note, Equal Employment
Opportunity for Americans Abroad, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1288, 1298 (1987); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 568-71 (3d ed. 1979).
113. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1279 (citing Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1027). The Supreme Court has held that economic effects of discrimination are rationally related to Congress' commerce clause powers and therefore regulation of discriminatory practices by private establishments affecting interstate commerce is justifiable. See Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). The dissent finds the
cumulative economic labor effects within the United States by a private employer overseas
under Title VII similar and applicable to the reasonableness standard of § 403 of the Re-
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to citizens abroad frustrates career advancements within the
United States because acceptance of foreign assignments is necessary to climb the corporate ladder .114 Women and minorities may
be reluctant to accept foreign assignments and prefer to remain in
the United States where they are fully protected by Title VII.m
The extraterritorial application of Title VII is needed to ensure
equal employment opportunities abroad so that career advancements within the United States are not adversely effected. 116
The dissent also asserted that the extraterritorial reach of Title VII does not impinge upon Saudi Arabia's sovereignty because
only those American corporations employing American citizens will
be subject to it. 117 Furthermore, the bona fide occupational qualification defense provided by Title VII 118 will alleviate any direct
conflict that may arise. 119 The dissent determined that Title VII's
extraterritorial reach does not unreasonably conflict with international law and concluded that the negative inference of the alien
exemption provision was a fair and reasonable interpretation
which evidenced clear congressional intent to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. 120
statement to justify regulating discriminatory effects abroad. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at
1027 n.16.
114. See id. at 1284.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 1283.
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1981).
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, ... on
the basis of his religion, sex or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or nation of origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise ....
Id.
119. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1283; see also Kern v. Dynaelectron, 577 F. Supp. 1196,
1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (the bona fide occupational qualification defense provided a mechanism for an American employer to discrimin(lte based on religion where the local regulations
prohibit non-Muslims from entering the holy city of Mecca and the penalty for violating
this law is death). Cf. Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex.
1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986) (religious discrimination against Jews participating
in a medical program in Saudi Arabia due to the friction between Jews and Arabs was not a
valid bona fide occupational qualification defense); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d
1273 (1981) (the bona fide occupational qualification defense must be narrowly construed to
preclude male gender as a valid basis for this defense where chauvanism of South American
businessmen was alleged).
120. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1283-84.
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In a lengthy opinion, the dissent found the necessity to extend
Title VII's scope extraterritorially based on national and · foreign
policy considerations, but its reasoning failed to substantiate the
congressional intent required to apply Title VII extraterritorially.
A closer examination of the dissent's two-pronged test shows that
the dissent misapplied the jurisdictional rule of reason as well as
the canon of statutory construction. The first part of this analysis
will discuss the jurisdictional rule of reason. The second part will
discuss the flawed application of the canon of statutory construction on three levels: first, the Supreme Court precedent that only
one presumption must be overcome; second, the Supreme Court
requirement that explicit congressional intent be shown before applying federal labor statutes extraterritorially; and third, the lack
of congressional intent necessary to support a negative implication.
The last part of this analysis will discuss the significance of
Boureslan and the need for congressional action.
A.

The Jurisdictional Rule of Reason

The dissent's two-pronged test is flawed because it is based
upon application of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 121 This Restatement provides that
the reasonableness test should be applied by the courts as a matter
of law to determine whether to authorize or exercise the extraterritorial application of a federal statute. 122 The dissent employed this
jurisdictional rule of reason as a matter of law in its threshold inquiry of whether the extraterritorial application of Title VII would
unreasonably frustrate international law. 123 The dissent's analysis,
however, goes beyond the Supreme Court's analyses in McCulloch
and Foley Bros., which only examined congressional intent and deferred resolution of potential conflicts to Congress. 124
Undermining the credibility of the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States is the fact that the
jurisdictional rule of reason has not been ruled upon by any
121. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
122. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403 comment g (concurrent jurisdiction based on the principles of nationality and territoriality may be reasonable as a matter of law to interpret legislation as to its reasonableness
in not violating international law); see also id. § 402 comment i (a court may prescribe
jurisdiction).
123. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1024.
124. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
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court. m Rather, courts traditionally apply the jurisdictional rule of
reason under the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States in determining whether to apply federal
legislation extraterritorially. 126 The courts have not prescribed extraterritorial jurisdiction as a matter of law in the absence of congressional intent, and defer to the legislation and executive
branches for foreign policy decisions. 127 To remedy the denial of
civil rights to American citizens employed abroad by United States
corporations, the dissent engaged in judicial legislation by applying
the rule of reason as a matter of law. 128
B.
1.

The Canons of Statutory Construction

The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality

The dissent's two-pronged test employed two presumptions
with differing requisite thresholds of congressional intent. 129 The
dissent's conclusion that two presumptions exist undermines the
Supreme Court's canon of statutory construction by separating the
125. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1025 n.10.
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 40 comment e (1965) (a reasonableness test should be applied to determine whether enforcement of a statute extraterritorially is reasonable); see also Laker Airways v. Sabena
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applied antitrust legislation extraterritorially because adjudication was reasonable in light of international comity to protect its
jurisdiction); Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (antitrust
laws to have world-wide reach but declined to enforce the Sherman Antitrust Act extraterritorially until a balancing test of twenty-six foreign countries' interest was determined in
light of international comity); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am ~ Nat'l Trust & Sav.
Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding the Sherman Antitrust Act had extraterritorial
jurisdiction but declined to enforce the Act because of the unreasonableness in light of international comity and fairness).
127. See Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection between
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 293 (1982) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1962)). "The
principal function of section 40 is to provide international legal sanctions for the exercise of
judicial restraint, which permits courts to justify their decisions not as judicial legislation
but rather as being consonant with the presumed intent of Congress to act in accordance
with international legal principles." Id.
128. See Addison v. Holly Fruit Prod. Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944) (quoting Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 522 (1942)).
While judicial function in construing legislation is not a mechanical process from
which judgment is excluded, it is nevertheless very different from the legislative
process. Construction is not legislation and must avoid 'that retrospective expansion
of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation.' To blur the
distinctive functions of the legislation and judicial processess is not conducive to
responsible legislation.

Id.
129. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
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presumption against extraterritoriality. 130 The second presumption
that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains" is not a
second presumption but a basic principle of international law. 131
This basic principle is rooted in international comity, which provides that the sovereignty of other nations should be respected in
determining whether to apply a domestic law extraterritorially. 132
The dissent's distinction between the two presumptions was
buttressed by the Court's reasoning in McCulloch. 133 Because the
Court never explicitly stated the term "presumption against extraterritoriality" and relied heavily upon the principles of international comity, the dissent concluded that the two presumptions are
in force. 134 The dissent's analysis, however, misconstrued the
Court's reasoning in McCulloch because that case dealt with extraterritorial jurisdiction on the high seas and not extraterritorial ju130. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
131. See Boureslan, 893 F.2d at 1272; accord American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356-57
(holding a United States-owned company in Panama had no cause of action under the Sherman Antitrust Act for antitrust violations). The Court in American Banana demonstrated
that the presumption against extraterritorial application incorporates the basic principles of
international law.
[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done .... For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to
treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did
the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority
of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent. . . . The foregoing considerations would lead in case of
doubt to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation
and effect to the territorial limits over which the the lawmaker has general and
legitimate power. 'All legislation is prima facie territorial.'
Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 437 (citation omitted; citing American Banana in setting forth the
presumption against extraterritoriality); see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Rule of Law Committee at 11-12, Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1988) (No. 97-2206). But see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS. LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415 (the
rigidity of the American Banana rule has been diminished by the Supreme Court by prescribing jurisdiction to regulate anti-competitive activities).
132. See Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between
Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 283 (1982).
The comity principle was originally developed to explain how a sovereign state, absolutely powerful within its own territory, could give recognition or effect in its
courts to another nation's laws without diminishing or denying its own sovereignty.
The doctrine is also one of local restraint, limiting the application of sovereign
power to extraterritorial events and persons.
Id.
133. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274 n.1 (citing Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1021-31); see
also Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1023; supra notes 28-32.
134. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1023.
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risdiction in regard to a particular locality. m
2.

The Requisite Congressional Intent

The dissent asserted that the canon of statutory construction
required merely unexpressed congressional intent for a court to apply a federal statute overseas. 186 However, Judge King understated
the importance of Title VIl's subject matter. 187 The Supreme
Court has determined that only clear express congressional intent
will overcome the presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal labor legislation. 188 The Court's reasoning is buttressed by the notion that a nation's sovereignty should be
respected because regulation of labor within its territory is primarily a domestic concern. 189
135. See McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 20-21.
Therefore, we find no basis for a construction which would exert United States jurisdiction over and apply its laws to the internal management and affairs of the
vessels here flying the Honduran flag, contrary to the recognition long afforded
them not only by our State Department but also by the Congress. In addition, our
attention is called to the well-established rule of international law that the law of
flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship.
Id. The McCulloch court was, therefore, restrained from asserting jurisdiction based on the
well established law of the high seas that provides that the state flag flown on the ship is the
sole state which may exercise jurisdiction over the ship. See id. But see Skiriotes, 313 U.S.
at 73-74 (a Florida criminal statute forbidding a certain type of sponge diving by its citizens
applied to the high seas or to a foreign country where "the acts are directly injurious to the
government, and are capable of perpetration without regard to particular locality ... ").
136. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274 n.1.
137. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1278-79. The dissent found support for the Love alternative negative inference of the alien exemption provision based on Foley Bros. See id. The
dissent asserted that "the court [in Foley Bros.] relied heavily on the fact that the [Eight
Hour Law] drew no distinction between citizens and aliens. An extraterritorial application,
therefore, would necessarily involve foreign national laborers, thereby creating a risk that
the United States would intrude upon an area of local concern to foreign nations." Id. at
1278. Thus, the dissent concluded that the necessary congressional intent was found because
the alien exemption provision explicitly differentiates between aliens and citizens and precludes coverage of aliens employed outside the United States. See id. "[C]ongress addressed
the factor that the Supreme Courts had identified as most likely to violate principles of
foreign sovereignty in the extraterritorial application of United States labor laws." Id. at
1278-79. But see STAFF OF COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REP. AND COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS U.S. SENATE, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987 at 1298 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter CouNTRY REPORTS]. Saudi Arabian
labor laws are irreconcilable with Title VII because equal opportunities for non-Muslims
and women are circumscribed. Id. In light of the above conflict with a host country's law
and international comity, Congress must explicitly state its intent to have Title VII extraterritorially applied.
138. See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. See also, Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1278
n.7. The dissent interpreted "the labor conditions of 'primary concern' to foreign nations
[to] refer[] to the employment of aliens by the United States enterprises abroad." Id. Con-
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The Negative Inference of the Alien Exemption Provision

The dissent employed the traditional methods of statutory
construction and found that the negative inference of the alien exemption provision and the legislative history clearly revealed that
Congress intended Title VII to be extraterritorially applied. 140 The
dissent found the Love alternative negative inference to be a persuasive indication of congressional intent and necessary to give
meaning to the provision. 141 Because aliens and citizens are both
treated as employees within the United States, the dissent asserted
that the Act's exemption of aliens is futile unless United States
citizens abroad were given Title VII protection. 142 The dissent's
reasoning, however, is repugnant to the canon of statutory construction because a negative implication drawn from the statutory
language is not an explicit statement of congressional intent. 143
The dissent found support for the Love alternative negative
inference of the alien exemption from the Supreme Court's reasoning in Espinoza. 144 Despite the irrelevancy of the Court's interpretation of this provision in light of the Court's failure to apply Title
VII extraterritorially, the dissent asserted that the Court's use of a
negative inference legitimatized its use of the Love alternative negative inference to ascertain congressional intent. 146 Moreover, the
dissent relied upon one statement in the legislative history, rejected by the majority on appeal and rehearing, which reveals that
the provision was intended by Congress to avoid international jurisdictional conflicts. 146 The dissent reasoned that the legislative
trary to the dissent, labor conditions in foreign nations are a primary and local concern. See
supra note 48. "The term 'sovereignty' expresses a nation-state's right to exercise absolute
political and legal authority over all persons and property within its territory . . . internal
sovereignty being the inherent right of a peoples to govern their internal affairs." Street,
Application of United States and Abroad, 19 INT'L L. & PoL. 357, 372 (1987.).
140. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1275-76.
141. See id. at 1275.
142. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (a facially nondiscriminatory zoning
ordinance that discriminates in its application violates the equal protection clause); see also
Truax v. Raich, 118 U.S. 356 (1915).
143. See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
144. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1276.
145. See id.
146. See id. (citing Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152, as amended by Subcomm. No.
5 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2303 (1963) (testimony of
James Roosevelt, member of Congress from State of California)).
In Section 4 of the Act, limited exception is provided for employers with respect to
employment of aliens outside of any state and also, to any religious corporations,
associations, or societies. The intention of the first exemption is to remove conflicts
of law which might otherwise exist between the United States and a foreign nation
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history supported the underlying logic of the Love alternative negative inference. 147 Although the dissent's reliance on the legislative
history is questionable because of its collaborative nature, 148 the
legislative history fails to explicitly state sufficient congressional
intent for the court to apply Title VII extraterritorially because a
negative inference must still be drawn from the legislative history
which is contrary to the canons of statutory construction for federal labor legislation. 149
C.

The Necessity for Congressional Action on Title VII

The sole issue presented in Boureslan is a critical question especially in light of the expansion of international trade and markets. The importance of whether the protection of Title VII extends to United States citizens employed by United States
multinational corporations on foreign soils was demonstrated by
the fact that the case was reheard by the full panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Boureslan decision will have
profound adverse effects upon many United States citizens and international civil rights laws. Congressional review of the extraterritorial scope of Title VII is necessary to discourage employment
discrimination in the United States and in the international
sphere.
1.

The Restrictive Scope of the Canon of Statutory Construction

The majority followed precedent by noting, but refusing to resolve, the serious foreign policy implications that are necessarily
encountered upon the extraterritorial application of Title VII. 160
The majority indicated that international application of Title VII
infringed upon other nations' sovereignty, especially where equal
employment opportunities are not recognized. un The majority's
in the employment of aliens outside the United States by an American enterprise.
Id.
147. See id. at 1276-77.
148. See id. at 1277 n.3. The dissent panel asserted that H.R. 405, the conclusions of
the Committee on Education and Labor, which was submitted into the record of H.R. 7152
and thus became Title VII, is "persuasive indicia of congressional intent" of the meaning of
the alien exemption provision. Id. But see id. at 1020 n.4. The majority held that a statement offered into the record by members of a House subcommittee that did not partake in
the voting of the bill from the Judiciary Committee, and to the full House for a final vote, is
not a clear expression of congressional intent. Id.
149. See supra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
150. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274.
151. See Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1020-21; see also COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 138.
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conclusion demonstrated the restrictive scope of the judiciai;y's
powers in the absence of the requisite congressional intent. 162 Pursuant to its power to legislate, Congress must determine whether
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the regulation of its nationals is reasonable in light of the serious foreign policy ramifications. 153
2. National and International Policy

The legislative history of Title VII reveals that the purpose of
the Act was to provide citizens with equal employment opportunities and to demonstrate this country's commitment against employment discrimination to the international community.m As indicated by the dissent, denial of Title VII protection to women and
minorities employed overseas substantially affects their right to
equal employment opportunities within the United States. 155 Fearing discriminatory treatment, women and minorities may be less
willing to accept foreign assignments, which might have a detrimental effect upon multinational employers' ability to hire qualified employees. 156 The denial of Title VII protection to citizens
employed abroad contravenes our national policy of equal employment opportunities. 157 Moreover, the international enforcement of
Title VII demonstrates the commitment of the United States to
furthering the international consensus against employment discrimination.158 Congressional action to amend Title VII is necessary to effectuate our national policy and the international commu152. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1274.
153. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
154. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1962, H.R. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
2156 (1962). "[C]ontinued employment in the United States casts doubt upon our sincerity
in furthering the cause of individual liberty and human dignity." Id.; see also Boureslan,
857 F.2d at 1028 (quoting Special Message to Congress by the President, June 19, 1963, 109
CONG. REC. 1055) "[L]egislative inaction on civil rights would result in 'weakening the respect with which the rest of the world regards us.'" Id.
155. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
156. See Title VII Does Not Apply to U.S. Citizens Employed Abroad by U.S. Companies, 129 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 265, 268 (Oct. 31, 1988).
157. But see Madigan, The Applicability of U.S. Employment Laws Abroad: A Legal
and Practical Approach, 4 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 319 (1978) (extraterritorial application of
Title VII would have injurious effects on United States employment, tax consequences, and
trade because United States multinational corporations are likely to relocate outside the
United States if Title VII liability was extended worldwide).
·
158. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1279 (citing Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1027-28). "Since
Title VII expands on anti-discrimination pr.inciples that have been the subject of international concern, there can be no doubt that the desirability of the regulation is generally
accepted, and that the regulation is important to the international community and consistent with the traditions of the international system." Boureslan, 857 F.2d at 1028.
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discrimination.

Congressional Precedent

The ADEA's amendment is of great significance to the determination of the extent of the extraterritorial protection under Title VII, because the amendment and Title VII have analagous purposes.169 In 1984, Congress amended the ADEA to provide
American citizens employed abroad with protection against arbitrary age discrimination perpetrated by American employers. 160
The protections under Title VII, however, are afforded higher constitutional stature by the Court because race, religion, national origin and sex are more suspect characteristics than age. 161 More importantly, the amendment also demonstrates that Congress was
concerned with potential for conflict between the ADEA and host
country labor laws. 162 The amendment explicitly states that an
American employer need not comply with the ADEA where extraterritorial application would violate the laws of the host country. 163
This amendment indicates that labor legislation drafted to eliminate employment discrimination .must have extraterritorial jurisdiction unless actual conflicts occur where American employers
have substantial control over their foreign affiliates and subsidiaries.164 Using the ADEA amendment as precedent, Congress should
amend Title VII to protect American citizens employed overseas
by American employers from employment discrimination based
upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 16 &
159. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
161. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1282; see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963) (First Amendment protection from religious discrimination); Korematsu v. United
States, 214, 215 (1944) (heightened scrutiny for racial classifications). But cf. Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age discrimination is precluded from any
suspect classification protections).
162. See Street, Application of U.S. Fair Employment Laws to Transnational Employers in the United States and Abroad, 19 INT'L L. & PoL. 357, 365-66 (1987).
163. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(l) (Supp. V 1985).
164. See Boureslan, 892 F.2d at 1279; see also, ADEA 29 U.S.C. § 623(g)(3)(A)-(D)
(Supp. V 1985); see also Street, supra note 162, at 365-66 ("this 'degree of control' test
involves an assessment of the interrelation of operations, common management, centralized
control of labor relations, and common ownership or financial control").
165. For a discussion on the questionability of the amendment, see Zimmerman, Extraterritorial Application of Federal Labor Law: Congress's Flawed Extension of the ADEA,
21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 103 (1988) (asserting that the ADEA's amendm~nt "is a dangerous
precedent" because it is imperialistic legislation that may impair United States foreign
relations).
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CONCLUSION

In light of the principles of international comity and the presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal labor
legislation, the majority faithfully adhered to the canon of statutory construction. The presumption against extraterritoriality must
be upheld because the negative inference of the alien exemption
provision in Title VII does not qualify as express congressional intent. In the absence of the requisite congressional intent, the
court's power is restricted by the canon of statutory construction.
Furthermore, the majority's unwillingess to resolve potential jurisdictional conflicts indicates that Congress alone has the authority
to provide Title VII with extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Despite the dissent's manipulation of the canon of statutory
construction and its attempts at judicial legislation, analysis underscores the need for the extraterritorial application of Title VII.
The dissent justified both the extraterritorial application of Title
VII and the United State's policy of promoting equal employment
opportunities, and advanced the international consensus against
employment discrimination. In the light of congressional precedent, the principle of international comity should not preclude the
extraterritorial application of federal employment discrimination
legislation. Congress must amend Title VII to redress the denial of
civil rights owed United States citizens working abroad for American employers.
Dina S. Goldstein
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